diff --git a/compliance-guide.tex b/compliance-guide.tex
index 1983d81..b46aa1a 100644
--- a/compliance-guide.tex
+++ b/compliance-guide.tex
@@ -115,116 +115,147 @@ commercial distributors, redistributors, and resellers on how to avoid
 violations in the first place, and to respond adequately and appropriately
 when a violation occurs.
 
-%FIXME-URGENT: integrate (into its own chapter)
-\chapter{FIXME-URGENT}
-
 \section{Who Has Compliance Obligations?}
 
-Distributors of licensed works—whether they are distributing modified or
-unmodified versions of the works, whether they have embedded executable
-copies of licensed works in a device, or are selling or otherwise
-transferring only a digital copy—have obligations to at least the users to
-whom they or intermediary parties distributed those copies. Whether those
-obligations run also to third parties not directly receiving their
-distribution of the works depends on the precise license involved, and their
-chosen mode of either distributing or offering to distribute source code. In
-addition, they have obligations to upstream parties, to preserve reasonable
-legal notices embedded in the code, and to mark modified versions
-appropriately.
-
-Both service providers and distributors have the obligation, in order to
-protect users’ rights, to refrain from imposing any additional restrictions
-on downstream parties. They must refrain from terms in ``umbrella licenses,''
-EULAs, or sublicenses that restrict downstream users’ rights as described
-above. Under the terms of LGPL, they must also refrain from license terms on
-works based on the licensed work that prohibit replacement of the licensed
-components of the larger non-LGPL’d work, or prohibit decompilation or
-reverse engineering in order to enhance or fix bugs in the LGPL’d components.
-
-Patent holders having claims reading on works they distribute have an
-obligation to refrain from enforcing those claims against parties to whom
-they distribute. Patent holders modifying and distributing works under the
-version 3 family of licenses have an obligation to refrain from enforcing any
-claims reading on the version they distributed, not only against that version
-as distributed, but also against any subsequent version or work based thereon
-that also practices those claims.
-
-All parties have an obligation to refrain from acting as a provider of
-services or distributor of licensed works if they have accepted, or had
-imposed on them by judicial action, binding legal conditions that would
-prevent them from meeting obligations to users as described. If a party is
-under such conflicting obligations, it has a duty to refrain from playing the
-role in which it is no longer free to meet its license obligations.
-
-\section{FIXME: Understanding Risk}
-
-we have observed that there is a significant mismatch between the assumptions
-businesses make about compliance and the realities of what goes wrong, what
-causes disputes, and how those disputes are resolved. Often, we have found
-companies preparing at great expense to avoid unlikely risks that have low
-historical incidence of occurrence and low cost of remediation, while leaving
-unmanaged the risks that have historically resulted in all the litigation and
-other adverse outcomes. In this section, we describe in broad terms the
-activities that help businesses prepare to meet their compliance obligations
-with minimal effort at minimal cost, dealing preventively with the compliance
-risks they really face.
-
-The mismatch between actual compliance risk and compliance risk management,
-in our experience, results from a misunderstanding of licensor
-intentions. Commercial parties often expect copyleft project communities to
-approach compliance as a form of copyright monetization, or else as an
-ideological effort to force proprietary software to be relicensed under
-copyleft terms. Under the assumption that the intention of the licensors is
-to take advantage of non-compliance to extract royalties, or to force the
-business’s proprietary products to be distributed under copyleft, businesses
-manage the risk that they will ``accidentally''—or as the result of
-unsupervised activity by individual programmers—copy infringing ``snippets'' of
-copylefted code into their own proprietary computer program. Risk management
-involves the purchase of expensive proprietary ``code scanning'' services that
-purport to detect such accidental inclusions. Effort is concentrated on how
-proprietary computer programs are made, to prevent ``infection'' by free
-software.
-
-In fact, however, development communities that use copyleft regard compliance
-failures as an opportunity to improve compliance. Every compliance failure
-downstream from their project represents a loss of rights by their users. The
-project, as copyright holder, is the guardian of its users’ rights. Their
-activity is designed to restore those rights, and to protect the project’s
-contributors’ intentions in the making of their software. Projects’ goals in
-seeking compliance are more often frustrated by the way software is delivered
-to users than by the way combinations of proprietary and free software are
-made. In particular,
+All distributors of modified or unmodified versions of copylefted works
+unmodified versions of the works have compliance obligations.  Common methods
+of modifying the works include innumerable common acts, such as:
 
 \begin{itemize}
 
-\item Users aren’t provided with required information about the presence of
-  copylefted programs and their applicable license terms in the product they
-  have purchased; or
+  \item embedding those works as executable copies
+    into a device,
 
-\item Users can’t reliably get complete and corresponding source code to
-  copylefted programs the distributor knew it was using and intended to use
-  pursuant to the license terms; or
+  \item transferring a digital copy of excutable copies to someone else,
+
+  \item posting a patch to the copylefted software to a public mailing list.
 
-\item Users get no response when they communicate with published addresses
-  requesting fulfillment of businesses’ obligations.
 \end{itemize}
 
+Such distributors have obligations to (at least) the users to whom they (or
+intermediary parties) distribute those copies.  In some cases, distributors
+have obligations to third parties not directly receiving their distribution
+of the works (depending on the distributors chosen licensing options, as
+described later in \S~\ref{binary-distribution-permission}).  In addition,
+distributors have compliance obligations to upstream parties, such as
+preservation of reasonable legal notices embedded in the code, and
+appropriate labeling of modified versions.
 
-In these and similar situations, the project’s goal is compliance with
-obligations intentionally incurred by intentional use of copylefted programs,
-through observance of fulfillment obligations to downstream users. Failures
-of this type, which are uncaught by scanning programs or other similar
-services, have resulted in all the litigation ever brought by copyleft
-communities around the world.
+Online service providers and distributors alike have other compliance
+obligations.  In general, they must refrain from imposing any additional
+restrictions on downstream parties. Most typically, such compliance problems
+arise from ``umbrella licenses:'' EULAs, or sublicenses that restrict
+downstream users’ rights under copyleft. (See \S~\ref{GPLv2s6} and
+\S~\ref{GPLv3s10}).
 
-Inclusions of free software in commercial proprietary products do happen. In
-our practice on behalf of copyleft-using development communities, we
-encounter such problems not frequently, but regularly. To the best of our
-knowledge, not one such instance has ever resulted in compliance litigation
-by a community party. These issues are regularly settled in an amicable and
-cooperative fashion.
+Patent holders having claims reading on GPL'd works they distribute must
+refrain from enforcing those claims against parties to whom they distribute.
+Furthermore, patent holders holding copyrights on GPLv3'd works must further
+grant an explicit patent license for any patent claims reading on the version
+they distributed, and therefore cannot enforce those specific patent claims
+against anyone making, using or selling a work based on their distributed
+version.  All parties must refrain from acting as a provider of services or
+distributor of licensed works if they have accepted, or had imposed on them
+by judicial action, any legal conditions that would prevent them from meeting
+any obligation under GPL\@.  (See \S~\ref{GPLv2s7}, \S~\ref{GPLv3s11} and
+\S~\ref{GPLv3s12}.
 
-%FIXME-URGENT: END
+\section{What Are The Risks of Non-Compliance?}
+
+Copyleft experts have for decades observed a significant mismatch between the
+assumptions most businesses make about copyleft compliance and the realities.
+Possibly due to excessive marketing of proprietary tools and services from
+the for-profit compliance industry, businesses perennially focus on the wrong
+concerns.  This tutorial seeks to educate those businesses about what
+actually goes wrong, what causes disputes, and how to resolve those disputes.
+
+Many businesses currently invest undue resources to avoid unlikely risks that
+have low historical incidence of occurrence and low cost of remediation,
+while leaving unmanaged the risks that have historically resulted in all the
+litigation and other adverse outcomes.  For example, some ``compliance
+industry''\footnote{``Compliance industry'' refers to third-party for-profit
+  companies that market proprietary software tools and/or consulting services
+  that purport to aid businesses with their Free Software license compliance
+  obligations, such as those found in GPL and other copyleft licenses.  This
+  tutorial leaves the term in quotes throughout, primarily to communicate the
+  skepticism most of this tutorial's authors feel regarding the mere
+  existence of this industry.  Not only do copyleft advocates object on
+  principle to proprietary software tools in general, and to their ironic use
+  specifically to comply with copyleft, but also to the ``compliance
+  industry'' vendors' marketing messaging, which some copyleft advocates
+  claim as a cause in the risk misassessments discussed herein.  Bradley
+  M.~Kuhn, specifically, regularly uses the term ``compliance industrial
+  complex''
+  \href{http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military-industrial_complex}{to
+    analogize the types of problems in this industry to those warned against
+    in the phrase of origin}.} vendors insist that great effort must be
+expended to carefully list, in the menus or manuals of embedded electronics
+products, copyright notices for every last copyright holder that contributed
+to the Free Software included in the product.  While nearly all Free Software
+licenses, including copylefts like GPL, require preservation and display of
+copyright notices, failure to meet this specific requirement is trivially
+remedied.  Therefore, businesses should spend just reasonable efforts to
+properly display copyright notices, and note that failure to do so is simply
+remedied: add the missing copyright notice!
+
+\section{Understanding Who's Enforcing}
+\label{compliance-understanding-whos-enforcing}
+
+The mismatch between actual compliance risk and compliance risk management
+typically results from a misunderstanding of licensor intentions.  For-profit
+businesses often err by assuming other actors have kindred motivations.  The
+primary enforcers of the GPL, however, have goals that for-profit businesses
+will find strange and perhaps downright alien.
+
+Specifically, community-oriented GPL enforcement organizations (called
+``COGEOs'' throughout the remainder of this tutorial) are typically
+non-profit charities (such as the FSF and Software Freedom Conservancy) who
+declare, as part of their charitable mission, advancement of software freedom
+for all users.  In the USA, these COGEOs are all classified as charitable
+under the IRS's 501(c)(3) designation, which is reserved for organizations
+that have a mission to enhance the public good.
+
+As such, these COGEOs enforce GPL primarily to pursue the policy goals and
+motivations discussed throughout this tutorial: to spread software freedom
+further.  As such, COGEOs are unified in their primary goal to bring the
+violator back into compliance as quickly as possible, and redress the damage
+caused by the violation.  COGEOs are steadfast in their position in a
+violation negotiation: comply with the license and respect freedom.
+
+Certainly, other entities do not share the full ethos of software freedom as
+institutionalized by COGEOs, and those entities pursue GPL violations
+differently.  Oracle, a company that produces the GPL'd MySQL database, upon
+discovering GPL violations typically negotiates a proprietary software
+license separately for a fee.  While this practice is not one a COGEO would
+undertaking nor endorsing, a copyleft license technically permits this
+behavior.  To put a finer point on this practice already discussed
+in~\S~\ref{Proprietary Relicensing}, copyleft advocates usually find copyleft
+enforcement efforts focused on extract alternative proprietary licenses
+distasteful at best, and a corrupt manipulation of copyleft at worst.  Much
+to the advocates' chagrin, such for-profit enforcement efforts seem to
+increase rather than decrease.
+
+Thus, unsurprisingly, for-profit adopters of GPL'd software often incorrectly
+assume that all copyright holders seek royalties.  Businesses therefore focus
+on the risk of so-called ``accidental'' (typically as the result of
+unsupervised activity by individual programmers) infringe copyright by
+incorporating ``snippets'' of copylefted code into their own proprietary
+computer program.  ``Compliance industry'' flagship products, therefore,
+focus on ``code scanning'' services that purport to detect accidental
+inclusions.  Such effort focuses on proprietary software development and view
+Free Software as a foreign interloper.  Such approach not only ignores
+current reality that many companies build their products directly on major
+copylefted projects (e.g., Android vendor's use of the kernel named Linux),
+but also creates a culture of fear among developers, leading them into a
+downward spiral of further hiding their necessary reliance on copylefted
+software in the company's products.
+
+Fortunately, COGEOs regard GPL compliance failures as an opportunity to
+improve compliance.  Every compliance failure downstream represents a loss of
+rights by their users. The COGEOs are the guardian of its users’ and
+developers' rights.  Their activity seeks to restore those rights, and
+to protect the project’s contributors’ intentions in the making of their
+software. 
 
 \chapter{Best Practices to Avoid Common Violations}
 \label{best-practices}
@@ -285,8 +316,28 @@ creative expression, no copyleft provisions are invoked.
 The core compliance issue faced, thus, in such a situation, is not an discussion of what is or is not a
 combined, derivative, and/or modified version of the work, but rather, issues related to distribution and
 conveyance of binary works based on GPL'd source, but without Complete,
-Corresponding Source.  This tutorial therefore focuses primarily on that issue.
+Corresponding Source.
 
+As such, issues of software delivery are the primary frustration for GPL
+enforcers. In particular, the following short list accounts for at least 95\%
+of the GPL violations ever encountered:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+
+\item The violator fails to provide required information about the presence
+  of copylefted programs and their applicable license terms in the product
+  they have purchased.
+
+\item The violator fails to reliably deliver \hyperref[CCS
+  Definition]{complete, corresponding source} (CCS) for copylefted programs
+  the violator knew were included (i.e., the CCS is either delivered but
+  incomplete, or is not delivered at all).
+
+\item Requestors are ignored when they communicate with violator's published
+  addresses requesting fulfillment of businesses’ obligations.
+\end{itemize}
+
+This tutorial therefore focuses primarily on these issue.
 Admittedly, a tiny
 minority of compliance situations relate to question of derivative,
 combined, or modified versions of the work.  Those
@@ -979,49 +1030,6 @@ under the GPL\@.  This section outlines a typical enforcement case and
 provides some guidelines for response.  These discussions are
 generalizations and do not all apply to every alleged violation.
 
-\section{Understanding Who's Enforcing}
-\label{compliance-understanding-whos-enforcing}
-% FIXME-LATER: this text needs work.
-
-Both  FSF and Conservancy has, as part their mission,  to spread software
-freedom. When FSF or Conservancy
-enforces GPL, the goal is to bring the violator back into compliance as
-quickly as possible, and redress the damage caused by the violation.
-That is FSF's steadfast position in a violation negotiation --- comply
-with the license and respect freedom.
-
-However, other entities who do not share the full ethos of software freedom
-as institutionalized by FSF and Conservancy pursue GPL violations differently.  Oracle, a
-company that produces the GPL'd MySQL database, upon discovering GPL
-violations typically negotiates a proprietary software license separately for
-a fee.  While this practice is not one that FSF nor Conservancy would ever
-consider undertaking or even endorsing, it is a legal way for copyright
-holders to proceed.
-
-Generally, GPL enforcers come in two varieties.  First, there are
-Conservancy, FSF, and other ``community enforcers'', who primarily seek the
-policy goals of GPL (software freedom), and see financial compensation as
-ultimately secondary to those goals.  Second, there are ``for-profit
-enforcers'' who use the GPL either as a crippleware license, or sneakily
-induce infringement merely to gain proprietary licensing revenue.
-
-Note that the latter model \textit{only} works for companies that hold 100\% of
-the copyrights in the infringed work.  As such, multi-copyright-held works
-are fully insulated from these tactics.
-
-% FIXME-URGENT: integrate, and rewrite so it doesn't laud behavior that is
-% ultimately problematic.
-
-companies have often formed beneficial consulting or employment relationships
-with project developers they first encountered through compliance
-inquiries. In some cases, working together to alter the mode of use of the
-project’s code in the company’s products was an explicit element in dispute
-resolution. More often, the communication channels opened in the course of
-the inquiry served other and more fruitful purposes later.
-
-    %FIXME-URGENT: END
-
-
 \section{Communication Is Key}
 
 GPL violations are typically only escalated when a company ignores the
@@ -1245,6 +1253,11 @@ contradict this permission.
 
 %FIXME-URGENT: integrate
 
+Under the terms of LGPL, they must also refrain from license terms on works
+based on the licensed work that prohibit replacement of the licensed
+components of the larger non-LGPL’d work, or prohibit decompilation or
+reverse engineering in order to enhance or fix bugs in the LGPL’d components.
+
 Section 2(a) states that if a licensed work is a software library (defined in
 \S0 as ``a collection of software functions and/or data prepared so as to be
 conveniently linked with application programs (which use some of those
@@ -1383,6 +1396,20 @@ with GPLv2, the license gives you clear provisions that you can rely on
 when you are forced to cut off support, service or warranty for a customer
 who has chosen to modify.
 
+
+% FIXME-URGENT: integrate, and rewrite so it doesn't laud behavior that is
+% ultimately problematic.
+\section{FIXME}
+
+companies have often formed beneficial consulting or employment relationships
+with project developers they first encountered through compliance
+inquiries. In some cases, working together to alter the mode of use of the
+project’s code in the company’s products was an explicit element in dispute
+resolution. More often, the communication channels opened in the course of
+the inquiry served other and more fruitful purposes later.
+
+%FIXME-URGENT: END
+
 \chapter{Conclusion}
 
 GPL compliance need not be an onerous process.  Historically, struggles
diff --git a/comprehensive-gpl-guide.tex b/comprehensive-gpl-guide.tex
index ec3bd06..69785ab 100644
--- a/comprehensive-gpl-guide.tex
+++ b/comprehensive-gpl-guide.tex
@@ -39,6 +39,19 @@
 %     These should be made consistent, using only two forms: one for line and
 %     one for a long quoted section.
 
+
+
+% FIXME: s/GPL enforcers/COGEOs/g
+
+%        (the term coined later but not used throughout) This can't be done
+%        by rote, since it may not be appropriate everywhere and shouldn't be
+%        used *before* it's coined in the early portions of
+%        compliance-guide.tex (and it's probably difficult to coin it earlier
+%        anyway).  BTW, I admit COGEOs isn't the best acronym, but I started
+%        with ``Community Enforcement Organizations'', which makes CEO, which
+%        is worse. :)  My other opting was   COEO, which seemed too close to
+%        CEO.  Suggestions welcome.
+
 \usepackage{hyperref}
 \usepackage{listings}
 \usepackage{enumerate}
diff --git a/gpl-lgpl.tex b/gpl-lgpl.tex
index c9110fa..13109f3 100644
--- a/gpl-lgpl.tex
+++ b/gpl-lgpl.tex
@@ -2652,6 +2652,7 @@ escape their obligations under the GPL by resorting to shrouded source or
 obfuscated programming.
 
 \subsection{CCS Definition}
+\label{CCS Definition}
 
 The definition of CCS\footnote{Note that the preferred term for those who
   work regularly with both GPLv2 and GPLv3 is ``Complete Corresponding
@@ -3954,6 +3955,7 @@ In future deals, distributors engaging in ordinary business practices
 can structure the agreements so that they do not fall under GPLv3~\S11\P7.
 
 \section{GPLv3~\S12: Familiar as GPLv2~\S7}
+\label{GPLv3s12}
 
 GPLv2~\S12 remains almost completely unchanged from the text that appears in
 GPLv2~\S7.  This is an important provision that ensures a catch-all to ensure